

## School Teachers' Review Body (STRB): Remit for the 30<sup>th</sup> Report

### Supplementary Comments from the Association of School and College Leaders on the Evidence Provided by Statutory Consultees

- 1 Following the submission of evidence provided by the statutory consultees with regard to the 30<sup>th</sup> remit of the School Teachers' Review Body (STRB), we wish to thank the organisations involved for the considerable thought and wisdom demonstrated in their responses.
- 2 The evidence submitted by the Department for Education required significant analysis and we have sought to address the main areas in this supplementary evidence, however, given the substantial changes proposed to the pay framework this has been challenging in the timeframe allowed.
- 3 We have also sought to address the additional questions asked of us by the STRB following their review of the submitted evidence:
  - ***The principles underpinning the Department's proposals for the classroom teachers pay structure:*** As you will have seen, the Department's submission provided specific proposals about uplifts to the national pay and allowance framework including the level of pay points between the minima and maxima of the MPR and UPR. It provided options for 2020/21 and a proposal for 2022/23. In addition to views on the pay levels proposed, we would welcome views from consultees on the principles of: a) establishing a pay structure for classroom teachers with higher starting pay and lower rates of annual pay progression; and b) equalising the differentials between pay points on the MPR and UPR;
  - ***The options for the MPR/UPR:*** The submissions we received presented a number of different views on the value of separate main and upper pay range. There seem to be three main options: i) maintaining the status quo; ii) combining the MPR and UPR into a single classroom teacher pay ranges; or iii) maintaining a separate MPR and UPR but providing additional guidance to clarify the role of teachers on each pay range. We would welcome views on the pros and cons of these three options; and
  - ***Implementation of the Department's proposals:*** As your members would be responsible for this, we would particularly welcome your views on any potential issues that you see arising out of the implementation at school level of the Department's proposals.
- 4 Again, given the time constraints it has been challenging to address these important issues in the level of detail we would have liked.
- 5 The proposed changes to the pay framework have the potential to impact both positively and negatively on teacher recruitment and retention. It is essential that any change is well considered and has a strong evidence base so that we

can have a high degree of confidence that its impact will be positive. We therefore urge the STRB to not be rushed into any change that is not well evidenced as the profession can ill afford a worsening of the current recruitment and retention crisis.

## Affordability

- 6 The government's evidence<sup>1</sup> indicates that a 3 per cent increase in the teacher pay bill is affordable by schools from September 2020. ASCL strongly disagrees with this and the following evidence demonstrates our reasons for this.
- 7 We have tested the impact of each of the DfE proposals on four sample secondary schools (schools 1-4 in the table below) and a primary school. The full staffing profiles are in Annex A. We have considered what the impact on the pay bill will be (including leadership @ 2.5%). The results are below:

Increase in pay-bill (%)	School 1	School 2	School 3	School 4	Primary
Option A	2.9%	2.8%	2.8%	2.5%	4.0%
Option B	3.0%	2.9%	2.9%	2.6%	3.0%
Option C	3.0%	3.0%	3.0%	2.8%	3.0%

- 8 We also compared our sample schools' staffing profiles to the national workforce allocated by spine point information included in Table B1 Annex B of the Government evidence to the STRB.

### *As a percentage of classroom teachers (Annex B1) DfE*

Spine point	National	school 1	school 2	school 3	school 4	Primary
M1	7.6%	9.2%	10.5%	5.5%	0.00%	13%
M2	6.8%	1.8%	2.8%	7.6%	0.00%	0%
M3	6.7%	1.8%	1.7%	3.0%	5.20%	13%
M4	6.4%	7.4%	3.5%	4.2%	3.47%	25%
M5	6.1%	7.4%	3.5%	2.4%	0.00%	13%
M6	12.8%	3.7%	7.0%	4.6%	1.73%	19%
U1	12.2%	5.5%	48.8%	10.6%	11.37%	0%
U2	11.0%	11.1%	17.4%	9.1%	9.40%	13%
U3	30.3%	52.0%	4.9%	53.0%	68.83%	6%
	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.00%	100%

- 9 What is clear is that whilst the national workforce data supplied by the DfE may be a national average, it is very far from being a true picture of the staffing structure in many schools: there are many significant variations that have not been factored into the DfE's costings.


<sup>1</sup> 'Government evidence to the STRB, the 2020 Pay Award' DfE, January 2020

## The September 2019 Spending Round


- 10 The spending round settled an additional £7.1 billion into the core schools' budget over a three-year period. In 2020/21 schools will receive an additional £2.6 billion (including £780 million to the high needs block). Levelling up minimum per pupil funding was a headline policy associated to the settlement. All primary schools will receive at least £3750 per pupil and secondaries £5,000 per pupil. How much, if anything, a school would benefit from this policy will be determined by, amongst other things, the level of per pupil funding that historic funding levels have delivered. The settlement also included an inflationary rise of 1.84 per cent for ALL schools.
- 11 Emerging evidence around the impact of the government's levelling up policy suggests that the budgets of many schools will not see increases sufficient to match a 3 per cent increase in the pay bill.
- 12 Nationally we know that one in four primary schools and 27 per cent of secondary schools are likely see inflationary increases only, or 1.84 per cent. The Education Policy Institute (EPI) analysis<sup>2</sup> indicates that schools in all parts of the country will be affected by this.

*Extract from EPI General Election 2019 Analysis Priority 3<sup>3</sup> : School Funding*

**Figure 3.4: Percentage of schools with low increases (inflation only) and large increases (at least 8 per cent) in pupil led per pupil funding between 2019-20 and 2020-21 under current government plans by school characteristics - primary**



**Figure 3.5: Percentage of schools with low increases (inflation only) and large increases (at least 8 per cent) in pupil led per pupil funding between 2019-20 and 2020-21 under current government plans by school characteristics - secondary**



<sup>2</sup> [https://epi.org.uk/publications-and-research/ge\\_2019\\_analysis/](https://epi.org.uk/publications-and-research/ge_2019_analysis/)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid page 38

- 13 The welcome increases in the core schools budget, which includes a £780 million cash injection to the high needs block, must also cover costs associated to projected growth in pupil numbers across the period, pay awards and increases in employer contributions for support staff, and inflationary rises to essential non staff commitments.

*Demands on the core schools budget settlement in 2020/21*

High needs	0.78	billion
Levelling up[1]	0.3	billion
Pupil growth[2]	0.3	billion
Inflation	0.8	billion
Total 2020/21	2.18	billion
Settlement	2.6	billion
<b>New money</b>	<b>0.42</b>	<b>billion</b>

- 14 The Government evidence to the STRB<sup>4</sup> indicates that in their opinion schools can afford a 3 per cent increase in the pay bill which would equate to £0.455 billion in the seven months September 2020 to March 2021 or £0.78 billion for the full funding year for academies.

How is the £7.1 billion being spent?

- 15 There is little information available regarding the distribution of the core schools' budget past 2020, however we are very concerned that the demands on the pot may exceed its capacity.
- 16 We have considered the NASUWT comment on affordability in respect of the impact of the proposed pay award and in the context of the £7.1 billion pledged in the September spending round. In our opinion the following NASUWT comment is fundamentally flawed.

*'The 2018 DfE School Workforce Census (SWC), published in July 2019, confirms that there are 453,400 full time equivalent teachers working in state funded schools in England. For illustrative purposes, this means that, if the whole additional increase in school funding was devoted to teachers' pay, this would meet the cost of the following pay increases across England:*

- 2020/21 (£2.6 billion) - £5,734 per teacher;
- 2021/22 (£4.8 billion) - £10,587 per teacher;
- 2022/23 (£7.1 billion) - £15,659 per teacher.

- 17 This section of their evidence<sup>5</sup> appears to suggest that the current status quo will be maintained for the next three years, and that all schools are sufficiently funded in 2019. In other words, any and all additions to the core schools' budget can be allocated to cover an increase in the salaries of the current number of teachers. Our comments above explain why this is not the case.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid (para 54)

<sup>5</sup> NASUWT evidence to the STRB, January 2020

## Performance Related Pay

- 18 We were pleased to note that all of the teaching unions are calling for the removal of performance related pay (PRP) as a mandatory requirement from the School Teachers' Pay and Conditions Document (STPCD).
- 19 There is no evidence to suggest that PRP has a positive impact on student outcomes and increasing evidence that it has a negative impact on workload and retention.<sup>6</sup>
- 20 However, we were concerned to read that the DfE need to keep PRP in order to make their proposals affordable. They state<sup>7</sup> that this '*requires schools to continue with their current policies towards performance based pay for all teachers, allowing similar numbers of high-performing teachers to progress more rapidly as now, and likewise continuing to constrain pay progression for similar numbers of lower-performing teachers as now*'.
- 21 Pre-determining the outcomes needed from decisions on teachers' pay progression in order to ensure a proposal is affordable is wholly inappropriate. PRP was introduced to improve standards, and there is no evidence to demonstrate that this has been the case.
- 22 Our position is that employers should have the autonomy to choose whether or not to continue with a PRP system, or whether to develop an alternative robust appraisal system that is not linked to pay progression. We cannot commend a model that relies on PRP to make it affordable.

## **Reform of the Classroom Teacher Pay Structure**

- 23 We note that there is a consensus amongst the majority of consultees, including ASCL, with relation to the classroom teacher pay structure, in that we feel that the current structure works relatively well as it is and that it does not need to be replaced by a single pay range.
- 24 As we covered in the body of our main evidence, the current structure was introduced to replace a single pay range with the aim of addressing recruitment and retention issues by offering higher salaries more quickly and access to a higher pay scale. When it was first introduced the new structure did indeed improve recruitment and retention.
- 25 The STRB sponsored some questions in the NFER's June 2019 Teacher Omnibus Survey<sup>8</sup>. One of these questions commissioned by the STRB was on which elements of the pay framework were an incentive to teachers to progress their career. The most commonly selected elements were TLR payments (68 per cent) and the Upper Pay Range (67 per cent), with 86 per cent of school leaders citing the Leadership Pay Range. If the Upper Pay Range provides an

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<sup>6</sup> [Factors affecting teacher retention: qualitative investigation, DfE March 2018](#)

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, page 42, paragraph B22

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/teachers-views-on-the-pay-framework-in-england>

incentive to progress to such a high proportion of teachers, it would be non-sensical to remove it.

- 26 We have also noted the DfE's own evidence. When considering the affordability of their models<sup>9</sup> they are quite clear that they have based their calculations on the retention of the two separate pay ranges for classroom teachers. Additionally, they rely on the current rates of progression being maintained. We are therefore somewhat surprised to see them asking for consideration of a move to a single pay range, as this would call into question their own affordability modelling.
- 27 The STRB have asked consultees explicitly for their views as to whether the two classroom teacher pay ranges should be maintained; combined into a single classroom teacher pay range; or maintained as separate ranges but with additional guidance to clarify the role of teachers on each pay range.
- 28 It is our strong view that the separate ranges should be maintained as, all other things being equal, they aid recruitment and retention: this was shown when they were first introduced. Ultimately, the main reason that the current system does not work as effectively as it could and should, is due to insufficient school funding and an attractive enough teacher pay framework to compete at both a graduate level and throughout a teacher's career.
- 29 We are not convinced that additional guidance is required. School leaders do not have the budgets they need to allow them to use the current pay flexibilities to their full extent, and additional guidance will not resolve this. In addition, given the fragmentation of the current school system, it is right that school policies should have the current degree of flexibility allowed within the STPCD to allow them to determine what access to the UPR should look like and what is required of a teacher on that range.

### **Assessment of the DfE Models**

- 30 We do not support any of the three models proposed by the DfE<sup>10</sup>. This is because they are all, in essence, the same model, albeit with small variants in the percentage uplifts.
- 31 We note that the DfE remit letter<sup>11</sup> to the STRB stated that there is a strong case for schools to move towards a less steep pay progression structure compared to what is currently typical in the early years of a teacher's career, but they then go on to contradict this by stating that this will be alongside significantly higher starting and early career salaries.
- 32 Their models propose a significantly higher increase to the minimum of the MPR. Their preferred model<sup>12</sup> suggests an increase to starting salaries of 6.7 per cent but this then reduces on a sliding scale along the range to point M5 which would receive an increase of 3.2 per cent.

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid page 42, paragraph B23

<sup>10</sup> Ibid paragraph 59

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/school-teachers-review-body-strb-remit-letter-for-2020>

<sup>12</sup> Ibid page 21, paragraph 64

33 The increase to M6 would then be 2.5 per cent in line with the proposed increases to the Upper Pay Range and Leadership Pay Range. So, although the starting salaries are significantly higher, this cannot be said for all early career salaries.

34 In addition, there are two fundamental flaws with the DfE's proposed 'model'.

#### Failure to Address Erosion of Experienced Teachers and School Leaders' Pay

35 The STRB highlighted in their 28<sup>th</sup> report<sup>13</sup> that *the decline in the position of the teachers' pay framework in the labour market for graduate professions needs to be addressed as a matter of priority. With the prospects for wage growth in the wider economy better than for several years, a significant uplift to teachers' pay is required to forestall a further weakening in the competitive position of the teaching profession.*

36 As a step towards this, they recommended a 3.5 per cent uplift to all pay ranges and allowances. However, the DfE decided not to follow this recommendation, and instead only awarded 2 per cent to the Upper Pay Range and 1.5 per cent to the Leadership Pay Range, exasperating the problem even further.

37 The STRB's 29<sup>th</sup> report again highlighted concerns over the deterioration of teacher earnings, stating '*we conclude that this steady decline in the competitiveness of the teachers' pay framework is a significant contributor to teacher supply difficulties. Until it is reversed, these difficulties will continue.*'<sup>14</sup>

38 Despite this, in all three of the DfE's proposed models a lower 'above inflation' increase between 2.25 per cent and 2.75 per cent is proposed for experienced teachers and school leaders.

39 Firstly, it is arguable as to whether these increases would actually be above inflation. Whilst they are above the current CPI forecast inflation rates for 2020 (1.85%)<sup>15</sup> they remain below the RPI forecast inflation rates for 2020 (3.1%)<sup>16</sup>, which given the significance of housing costs on the profession is concerning<sup>17</sup>.

40 All three proposals fail to address the erosion of pay since 2010. They will all, therefore, leave school leaders facing a real terms' decrease in pay since 2010 of between 10% (CPI) and 15% (RPI).

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<sup>13</sup> STRB's 28<sup>th</sup> Report, 2018

<sup>14</sup> STRB's 29<sup>th</sup> report, 2019

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.statista.com/statistics/306720/inflation-rate-forecast-consumer-price-index-cpi-united-kingdom-uk/>

<sup>16</sup> <https://www.statista.com/statistics/374890/retail-price-index-rpi-forecast-united-kingdom-uk/>

<sup>17</sup> <https://obr.uk/forecasts-in-depth/the-economy-forecast/inflation/>

## Assumed Success of the Flatter Pay Structure in London

- 41 In their evidence the DfE state<sup>18</sup> that the flatter pay structure they are proposing across all three of their models is not dissimilar to the current pay structure in London, where teachers receive a higher starting salary which reduces along each pay range as a result of the weightings awarded to Inner London, Outer London and the Fringe.
- 42 In adopting a model already in use, one might assume that said model was a well evidenced and proven success and that recruitment and retention was significantly better as a result of its use.
- 43 However, whilst the DfE state in their evidence that they believe there is a strong case that these reform proposals will in fact provide much needed support for both recruitment and retention<sup>19</sup>, evidence shows that London experiences the worst teacher recruitment and retention problems.
- 44 Indeed, analysis carried out by the DfE themselves states that teacher retention problems are more acute in London than across the UK<sup>20</sup>.
- 45 A DfE report<sup>21</sup> showed that the predicted odds of leaving the profession were highest for London. The chart below is taken from the report, and it is clear to see that the odds are even higher for school leaders in both primary and secondary.



Note: East of England is the reference category. The plotted odds ratios are the medians of the five odds ratios estimated on the five year-on-year School Workforce Census datasets.

- 46 There is a similar picture for recruitment. A recent report from TeachVac<sup>22</sup> shows that the highest proportion of vacancies in the secondary sector are in London at 22 per cent, with a further 22 per cent in the South East and 13 per cent in the East of England.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, Page 22/23, paragraph 69

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, page 49, paragraph B52

<sup>20</sup> Analysis of teacher supply, retention and mobility, DfE, September 2018

<sup>21</sup> Analysis of teacher supply, retention and mobility, DfE, May 2017

<sup>22</sup> The TeachVac Review, January 2020



- 47 The table below, which was taken from the report<sup>23</sup>, shows how the figures for London are increasing year on year.

Table 1: Vacancies identified through TeachVac in 2017 and 2018 – by sector and Government Region

Government Region	Primary Sector			Secondary Sector		
	2017	2018	2019	2017	2018	2019
East Midlands	8.50%	7.50%	8.0%	7.70%	7.50%	8.0%
East of England	12.80%	12.30%	14.0%	13.30%	12.70%	13.0%
London	11.50%	13.00%	13.0%	16.20%	20.10%	22.0%
North East	2.40%	1.70%	1.0%	2.80%	2.70%	2.0%
North West	11.10%	10.60%	11.0%	9.50%	9.60%	8.0%
South East	26.70%	26.20%	23.0%	23.50%	22.10%	22.0%
South West	9.50%	11.10%	12.0%	9.90%	9.60%	9.0%
West Midlands	7.10%	8.20%	8.0%	8.90%	9.10%	8.0%
Yorkshire & the Humber	10.30%	9.40%	10.0%	7.70%	6.60%	8.0%

Source: TeachVac

- 48 The report also shows that of the top 50 schools with the most recorded<sup>24</sup> vacancies in 2018, 22 were schools in London.
- 49 We therefore have little confidence in the model that the DfE is proposing and they have provided no evidence to support its supposed likely success. Again, the only conclusion one can draw is that they are putting forward models based on a predetermined funding envelope and not on what will, in reality, have any impact on recruitment or retention.

## Summary

- 50 Due to the fundamental flaws in the DfE's modelling we are unable to support any of the three proposals and respectfully refer the STRB to our previous evidence of 20 January 2020 where we have set out a proposal which will, we believe, address the current recruitment and retention crisis.

## **London Pay Areas**

- 51 The DfE's model proposes 'slightly' lower uplifts for London areas *given their more generous starting position*<sup>25</sup>. Currently, London salaries are weighted due to the increased costs associated with living in these areas: it is disingenuous to consider these to be more generous, and also incredibly unfair to reduce the level of these weightings.
- 52 As we have highlighted above, despite these weightings, recruitment and retention continues to be challenging in London. As we stated in our original evidence, a recent study by Trust for London<sup>26</sup> estimates that the cost of living and working in London is 20 per cent more expensive than the rest of the UK.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, page 3

<sup>24</sup> Ibid page 11

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, Page 22/23, paragraph 69

<sup>26</sup> <https://www.trustforlondon.org.uk/publications/minimum-income-standard-london-2018/>

- 53 In our modelling we calculated what the starting salaries for the London pay areas should be in line with an increase to £30,000 for the rest of England.
- 54 We have compared these with the salaries proposed by the DfE<sup>27</sup> (paragraph 60) and the difference in the weightings is shown below;

		2019	2022	% difference	2019	2022	% difference	2019	2022	% difference	2019	2022
	Point	England (excl. the London Area)	England UPATED		Inner London Area	Inner London UPATED		Outer London Area	Outer London Area UPATED		Fringe Area	Fringe Area UPATED
<b>ASCL</b>	M1 (min)	£24,373	£30,000	25.06	£30,480	£37,517	16.34	£28,355	£34,901	4.80	£25,543	£31,440
<b>DfE</b>	M1 (min)	£24,373	£30,000	18.30	£30,480	£35,500	10.70	£28,355	£33,200	3.33	£25,543	£31,000
	<b>Difference</b>	£0	£0	-6.76	£0	-£2,017	-5.64	£0	-£1,701	-1.47	£0	-£440

- 55 Data from the School Workforce Census (SWC) 2018<sup>28</sup>, shows that schools in Inner London have a total of 59.4 per cent of the teaching workforce paid on either the Leadership Pay Range (15.8 per cent) or in receipt of allowances (43.6 per cent).
- 56 For all other areas<sup>29</sup>, the total is 49.6 per cent, with the average proportion of teachers paid on the Leadership Pay Range at 14.5 per cent and those in receipt of allowances at 35.1 per cent.
- 57 This demonstrates that, even with the London weightings, these schools are having to pay their teachers more money to either recruit or retain them. More evidence not only that the weightings themselves remain essential but that the higher starting salary combined with flatter later rates of pay is not a model that has a proven track record in resolving recruitment and retention.
- 58 In our view, the London weightings are vitally important to people working in London areas, and to employers who are trying to recruit in the current recruitment and retention crisis<sup>30</sup>. It has to be the case that, in London, as we are arguing for elsewhere, that the points are all uprated in line with the new starting salary. If this is not done then the DfE proposals can only serve to worsen both recruitment and retention in the London pay areas.

## Differentiated Pay Awards

### Impact on Recruitment

- 59 We were encouraged to see so many other consultees taking the same position as ASCL, in that any increase applied to the starting salaries for teachers must be replicated to other pay ranges, a model the DfE did not consider in its evidence and has provided no arguments for or against to date.

<sup>27</sup> 'Government evidence to the STRB, the 2020 Pay Award' DfE, January 2020

<sup>28</sup> [Regional, LA and school tables: school workforce census 2018](#)

<sup>29</sup> Ibid

<sup>30</sup> Ibid

- 60 Experienced teachers and school leaders have already seen reduced pay differentials due to targeted awards over recent years, the DfE model would simply exacerbate the issue.
- 61 We note, and support, NEOST's evidence<sup>31</sup> which also highlights the reduction in pay differentials between the top of the Upper Pay Range and the bottom of the Leadership Pay Range and '*how the size of future increases in classroom teacher salary levels are highly likely to increase the difficulty in recruiting good school leaders*', as reported by several authorities.
- 62 The DfE evidence<sup>32</sup> states that pay can attract a greater number of more able candidates to apply for individual jobs but much of this can be due to movement of candidates who are already qualified/working in a particular industry.
- 63 However, increasing pay a whole-profession level means trying to attract potential teachers working in/considering working in other professions. As these are far more differentiated from teaching than the direct competition example, pay differentiation may not be as effective at increasing recruitment<sup>33</sup>.
- 64 They also state that it is not clear how potential teachers would view the changes to the pay structure as a whole and as such feel it is extremely difficult to estimate the magnitude of any recruitment benefits by these reforms<sup>34</sup>.
- 65 As these proposals are phased and will not be fully implemented until September 2022, it will be a significant amount of time before the actual impact can be measured.
- 66 Even if we were to assume that the proposals would be successful, with a significant increase in pupil numbers forecast by 2026, the impact would need to be almost miraculous to ensure that teacher supply meets demand.

### Impact on Retention

- 67 With retention being as much, if not more, of an issue as recruitment, it would be misguided to consider implementing a significant increase to starting salaries without addressing pay for experienced teachers and school leaders at the same time, as the government is suggesting<sup>35</sup>.
- 68 It is quite staggering to see, by the DfE's own admission, that the estimated impact their proposals will have is to reduce the number of teachers leaving the profession by just a quarter of a percentage point<sup>36</sup> (approximately 1,000 teachers).

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<sup>31</sup> National Employers' Organisation for School Teachers, Evidence to the School Teachers' Review Body, January 2020

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, page 48, paragraph B48

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, page 49, paragraph B49

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, page 49, paragraph B50

<sup>35</sup> As above

<sup>36</sup> Ibid page 48, paragraph B45

- 69 They also acknowledge<sup>37</sup>, albeit it very late on in their proposal, that it does not necessarily mean we will see the number of leavers from the profession fall by the estimated 1,000+ teachers in 2022 compared to 2019. Rather they are forced to concede that this will depend on a number of economic and other factors which impact on the teacher labour market in the interim.
- 70 Also, to be considered is that the DfE's Teacher Recruitment and Retention Strategy does not address workload for senior leaders.
- 71 From the modelling used in the DfE evidence, it is clear that all of their proposals are based on affordability rather than need. Across the MPR and UPR, 53.6 per cent of teachers are on M6 or UPR. Therefore, this could go some way to explaining why the Department's proposals only include points M1-M5 in the higher uplifts and the bare minimum for M6 and the Upper Pay Range.
- 72 Furthermore, their attempt to justify another differentiated award, which yet again penalises experienced teachers and school leaders, is weak to say the least.
- 73 They say that pay *'is a lower relative priority for these teachers in their decisions whether to remain in the profession – in comparison to workload or flexible working opportunities that the department is addressing through our recruitment and retention strategy – and that salaries compare more favourably currently on the upper and leadership pay ranges'*.
- 74 Quite how they come to that conclusion is puzzling. In our evidence we have repeatedly stated that these teachers were disillusioned and disenfranchised by the differentiated award in 2018.
- 75 This was also acknowledged in the STRB's 29th report<sup>38</sup>: *'Overall, while in previous years we have recommended some targeting of early career teachers, we do not think that this is the right approach for this round. On visits, we were struck by how negatively many school leaders and senior staff viewed the Government's targeted approach to uplifts last year. If the most experienced teachers believe they are being repeatedly disadvantaged in order to direct resources towards the newest recruits, this will not create a good environment for the retention of teachers at any stage of their careers.'*
- 76 To implement a series of differentiated pay awards for the next three years will simply be a case of rubbing salt in the wound for these teachers and leaders and exacerbate an already serious retention crisis, at exactly the same time that we will be need significantly more teachers due to the projected increase in pupil numbers.
- 77 If the proposals went ahead, in the first year alone it would mean that the starting salaries for teachers would have increased by an additional 7 to 7.5 per cent than that of experienced teachers and school leaders due to the differentiated awards in 2017 and 2018. This would be even worse for any

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid, page 48, paragraph B47

<sup>38</sup> STRB 29<sup>th</sup> Report, July 2019

Headteachers who were at the top of their Headteacher Group in 2015 when no uplift was awarded.

- 78 The DfE's statement that salaries '*compare more favourably on the upper and leadership pay ranges*<sup>39</sup>' is vague: what do they compare more favourably with? They certainly don't compare as favourably with the levels they should be if they had increased in line with inflation since 2010.
- 79 The DfE evidence<sup>40</sup> also states that senior leaders in secondary schools are paid significantly more than their counterparts in primary schools as though there is something untoward going on. The STPCD contains clear guidance on setting Headteacher Groups and Headteacher pay ranges, so the pay for senior leaders in secondary schools will generally be higher than in primary due to formula and weightings used to calculate as school size is a sizeable contributory factor.
- 80 Much of their evidence focuses on the fact that younger teachers are more influenced by pay, but completely overlooks that fact that we have an increasingly younger profession, which is part of the problem. Therefore, the strategy will not work in the long-term, it will simply increase turnover.
- 81 In our initial evidence, we included projected retention figures that we have extrapolated from the SWC data<sup>41</sup>. Those projections showed that of the teachers who qualified in 2018, 24 per cent would leave by the end of their 2nd year, almost 40 per cent by the end of their 5<sup>th</sup> year and over half by the end of their 10<sup>th</sup> year. This demonstrates that the downward trend in retaining teachers is not only set to continue but to become even worse.
- 82 Serious and urgent action is required to reverse these trends, and simply making significant increases to the starting salaries whilst not addressing the salaries of our experienced teachers and school leaders is not the solution.

## **Vacancies**

- 83 Much of the DfE's evidence on vacancies is based around data from the SWC. However, a DfE report<sup>42</sup> in September 2016 included a warning on this, '*It should be noted that vacancies, particularly in November, are not a comprehensive indicator of recruitment situations within a school*'.
- 84 The DfE states<sup>43</sup> *the School Workforce Census shows a very low and fairly stable picture of overall headship vacancies at around 0.2%. The rate is calculated from the number of full-time permanent headship vacancies that were available on the census day each November, as a proportion of full-time heads in post. Vacancies recorded are those that have been advertised and*

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid, page 20, paragraph 59

<sup>40</sup> Ibid page 76, paragraph E4

<sup>41</sup> Ibid

<sup>42</sup> Schools workforce in England 2010 to 2015: trends and geographical comparisons. September 2016

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, page 79, paragraph E8

remain unfilled. Vacancies must be available for a minimum of one term. They include those filled on a temporary basis for a period of less than one term.

85 However, this figure does not include the temporarily filled posts where a vacancy exists, advertised or not, which is currently being filled by a teacher on a contract of at least one term but less than a year. These vacancies represent an additional 0.8%. These need to be considered as a whole and as part of the overall picture on headship vacancies.

86 We note that NEOST’s evidence <sup>44</sup> states that ‘there has been no easing off from an already high base of authorities reporting a growing difficulty for schools in recruiting quality applicants for senior leadership posts (head teacher positions in particular). This relates to both quantity and quality of candidates.’<sup>45</sup> They also report a growing trend in response to difficulties to recruit to single school head teacher vacancies, that schools are, where feasible, restructuring and creating Executive Head Teacher roles across two or more schools, but that in some areas a shortage of effective leaders who are prepared to take on this challenge is putting strain on this model too.

87 This is supported by evidence on leadership vacancies from TeachVac.

88 The table below is taken from the TeachVac Annual report<sup>46</sup> and shows the proportion of leadership vacancies for the last three years, with primary sector vacancies at 14 per cent (from 23 per cent in 2017) and secondary sector vacancies remaining constant at four per cent.

Table 2: Percentages of vacancies identified by TeachVac by job level and sector 2017 and 2018

	Primary Sector			Secondary Sector		
	2017	2018	2019	2017	2018	2019
Classroom Teacher	75.0%	84.0%	84.0%	86.0%	80.0%	78.0%
Promoted post below Leadership Scale	2.0%	1.0%	1.0%	11.0%	18.0%	18.0%
Assistant Head and other initial Leadership Scale posts	6.0%	3.0%	3.0%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%
Deputy Head and other middle Leadership Scale posts	10.0%	5.0%	4.0%	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%
Head Teacher and other senior Leadership Scale posts	7.0%	8.0%	7.0%	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%

Source: TeachVac

89 A further TeachVac Annual report<sup>47</sup> on leadership scale vacancies, shows rates of re-advertisements for headship posts for the academic year 2018/2019 at 24% in the primary sector and 16% in the secondary sector.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, (page 6, paragraph 25)

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, page 6, paragraph 25

<sup>46</sup> Ibid page 3

<sup>47</sup> The Labour Market for School Leaders in England: Key features for 2019, TeachVac

## Restoration of Pay Scales to the STPCD

- 90 There is a commonality amongst the evidence from all consultees for pay scales to be restored in the STPCD, with the government's evidence<sup>48</sup> even using the joint union recommended pay scale values. It is our view that the re-adoption of scale points into employers' pay policies must be a mandatory element of the STPCD and this will ensure that annual pay awards are applied to all points within each range, rather than just the minima/maxima as is the current situation.
- 91 However, whilst other consultees call for them to be mandatory fixed points, we would recommend that they are mandatory *minimum* points to still allow employers some flexibilities. This will allow for employers who face particular recruitment and/or retention difficulties to offer enhanced values to the points in their scales without ever going below the national minimum.

## Other issues

### Forms of differentiation

- 92 We strongly oppose the suggestion from the DfE<sup>49</sup> that a future remit is likely to need to look at whether forms of differentiation (e.g. geographical, subject, phase) would be appropriate.
- 93 Again, the current pay system offers flexibilities to employers to address these issues, but the insufficient funding of the sector prevents it. To further complicate the pay system without adequately funding it will do nothing to resolve recruitment and retention in specific areas (be that geographical, subject or phase), rather it is more likely to worsen it across the board.

### Safeguarding

- 94 We also note that NEOST state that '*the majority of their stakeholders think*'<sup>50</sup> it is an ideal time to review the teacher salary protection regulation as they see that this is no longer consistent with arrangements for other school-based employees.
- 95 Firstly, we would question where their evidence is to support this claim.
- 96 Secondly, we strongly disagree with this and feel that this must remain a mandatory element of the STPCD.
- 97 This issue was comprehensively considered by the STRB in their 24<sup>th</sup> report in 2013<sup>51</sup>, and their recommendation was as follows; *we consider that the current safeguarding provisions remain appropriate, supporting schools' ability to restructure when circumstances change without causing excessive disruption to*

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<sup>48</sup> 'Government evidence to the STRB, the 2020 Pay Award' DfE, January 2020

<sup>49</sup> Ibid page 7, paragraph 14

<sup>50</sup> Ibid page 11, paragraph 55

<sup>51</sup> STRB 23<sup>rd</sup> Report, 2014

*individuals or schools and providing reassurance for staff moving to take up their first management roles. We recommend the existing provisions be consolidated into one place in the STPCD.*

- 98 In their evidence for the 24<sup>th</sup> remit NEOST<sup>52</sup> had also requested that the length of the safeguarding be reduced, suggesting one year was appropriate. The STRB found<sup>53</sup> that three years was common provision within the public and voluntary sector and therefore teachers were in line with that. We see no evidence of any material change that would warrant a change to the STPCD at this time.

### Implementation of the Department's Proposals

- 99 If the Department's proposals were to go ahead, this would present a series of issues for our members, relating to the implementation of them.
- 100 Firstly, the Department has been clear that there is no additional funding to support their proposals, so schools would be expected to fund them from their current budgets. As we have highlighted above, affordability is going to be a significant issue for a considerable number of schools.
- 101 Many schools have already been required to submit their budget forecasts for the period of the proposals, and were under the impression that further Teacher Pay Grants would be made available to cover these awards.
- 102 The assimilation process indicates that mid-points will be rounded down as well as up. If this were to be the case, despite it being contrary to all usual pay review body standard practice, school leaders would be distracted from leading educational improvement and would have to deal with unrest and anger amongst teachers and their union representatives.
- 103 For schools with a high proportion of staff on M1-M5 the proposals will have a disproportionate negative effect on their budgets. Conversely, schools with a higher proportion of senior staff will be facing issues of lower morale and disengagement.
- 104 The proposals require the continuation of PRP and the same rates of progression to be affordable, this will place pressure on school leaders to adhere to these rates rather than operating a fair and transparent appraisal system. Again, this will lead to unrest amongst the workforce and impact on recruitment and retention.

### **Summary**

- 105 We are disappointed by the DfE's proposals which are based solely on a perceived affordability figure, which in reality is not even that.
- 106 They have failed to consider appropriately the impact of their proposals on retention, despite the Public Accounts Committee Report '*Retaining and*

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid, page 50, paragraph 3.52

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, page 51, paragraph 3.54



*Developing the Teaching Workforce*<sup>54</sup> of 2018 explicitly stating that ‘*The Department has failed to get a grip on teacher retention*’. We are concerned that that warning does not appear to have been heeded.

- 107 Rather, they have gone for a publicity grabbing headline starting salary figure and then tried to make that fit in the already announced additional funding.
- 108 We agree that starting salaries need to increase, but as we have evidenced, recruitment is not the only issue and in order to retain teachers at all levels, the proposed increase needs to be mirrored through all points and ranges.
- 109 Additionally, the additional funding announced by the Government in September 2019 is woefully insufficient if it is intended to cover even the proposed increases to the pay framework. School funding has been hit so hard in real terms over recent years that truly significant sums are needed: the money announced for the spending round will need to cover a number of pressing areas. As we have evidenced, there is insufficient money to cover a three per cent increase to the teacher pay bill, and in any event, more is needed as the DfE’s proposed model will not address the current recruitment and retention crisis.
- 110 If the Government is serious about addressing the continuing recruitment and retention crisis then they will need to put their money where their mouth is. They must fund a model that addresses retention and provide funding to fully cover the additional costs.
- 111 We look forward to discussing these issues further when we meet with the STRB on the 16<sup>th</sup> March.

Louise Hatswell  
Pay and Conditions Specialist  
17 February 2020

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<sup>54</sup> <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpubacc/460/46003.htm>

## Staffing Profile of Sample Schools

All schools are outside London

		Sample Secondary Schools				Primary
		School 1	School 2	School 3	School 4	Primary
NoR pre-16		884	668	914	841	208
NoR post-16		129	282	303	202	
fte on M1		5	6	3.6	0	1
fte on M2		1	1.6	5	0	0
fte on M3		1	1	2	3	1
fte on M4		4	2	2.8	2	2
fte on M5		4	2	1.6	0	1
fte on M6		2	4	3	1	1.5
fte on U1		3	28	7	6.56	
fte on U2		6	10	6	5.42	1
fte on U3		28.2	2.8	34.9	39.71	0.5
Total fte		54.2	57.4	65.9	57.69	8
Average salary		35277.84	35506.5	35424.39	37030.85	32530.69
Percent UPS		69%	71%	73%	90%	